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Wings & Things Guest Lecture Series

Air War in Korea: A Chinese Perspective

Air War College professor Dr. Xiaoming Zhang discusses the Chinese perspective of the air war in Korea.

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. It is my pleasure to be here as a guest speaker under the invitation with General Metcalf, under the museum. I believe you have heard a lot of the air battles stories. You know a lot of air battle stories, too. But tonight I'm going to give you a different story about the air battles or air war in Korea from a Chinese perspective. Ten years ago I started my research on the air war in Korea from a communist side, not from the UN-American side. One of my research efforts is dedicated to my father. He was a PLA Aid Officer in the Korean War and the photos, I will give you later and you can... I will tell a little bit about what his crew did in Korea. So the book published in 2002, that is eight years ago, and I still enjoy very much, myself, the memories of those people who helped me to write this book.

At lunch time I talked to the researchers of the museum and something came to my mind that I want to remind you; that is the story that I am going to tell you. It may not be the true fact because we can't stick to the fact because human memories are biased. The history we try to understand, we try to learn. So perhaps it's not facts but just what we want to know, what we believe it is. So the people who are interviewed during my research, I never thought those people are dishonest. However, the story I will tell you may be not the truth but is however, something deeply buried in their minds as part of the history of their own. And today I am going to go over... these are the five areas which is covered in the book that I have written. And mostly I focus on the Chinese side of the story. There are two chapters talking about Soviet involvement and I won't tell you anything about that other than show you some slides and if anyone wants to know what the Russian's contribution to the air war in Korea is, I just wish that you go to read my book. But I am not trying to advertise my book and I know the text of AM University Press is already happy enough for so many copies having sold so far. I believe it is the third print and is already tended to run out and shortly. Okay.

The first thing I am going to cover is talk about the whole air power played a significant role in Chinese decision for intervention. It's an amazing story and since we have a free speech, free press right in United States so I am able to tell this story. And this story has never been told in China. And secondly we will talk about what the Chinese initial plan and strategy for getting themselves in the air war. And then I will briefly talk about how they were frustrated and tried to get the plan to go and then I will talk about the Chinese air operation in Korea and finally I will try to say what the experience and lessons they learnt from the Korean War and its implication to them or to us. What I understand the roles of the Chinese Air power in today's security environment. Almost... it's actually just one month away, 60 years ago the Korean War broke out and less than a week when the war started, Joseph Sterling sent a telegram to Beijing, to Chinese leaders asking the Chinese leaders to prepare their military for intervention. In that

telegram Joseph Sterling promised he would send a MiG-15 division to China immediately to provide the air cover for the Chinese forces.

At that time Chinese air forces was just created a year ago, less than a year ago at Denmat. It only had a handful of pilots having to start from the MiG-15 yet and after receiving that telegram the Chinese leader did think about taking some advanced preparation for what so called eventuality. One pre-condition is that the Chinese forces would have the air cover of Russia. So that Sterling promise to my study, that is one of the key reasons for only Chinese decision to propel for forceful intervention. And in all this I believe in late August that Meet division arrived in China and in the meantime Chinese moved the army troops to the borders and prepared for forceful intervention. When the situation turned around in September and particularly when later and Chinese leaders and received a telegram from Kim Yon Son on October 1 just a few days before the fall of the Penya I believe and he urgently asked the Chinese for intervention because Sterling told him that you can't depend on us for help. You have to turn yourself to the Chinese. So after receiving Kim Yon Son's telegram more began to think about a serious intervention. One problem he came across at that time is who will command the Chinese forces in Korea to confront UN forces. And finally he found a general, General Pong and he summoned him to Beijing from far West to China to command him to the job. One thing Mob promised him that there would be the air cover from Russia. When Pong went to the North East China, he tried to assemble the troops together. He asked the general who was already in the region, "What about the cooperation between his run troops and the air force?" Nobody knows there would be an air force.

So he sent a telegram back to Beijing asking about the details of the air cover issues. And at that moment Beijing realized that the air cover is a big issue for forceful Chinese intervention. So he sent another telegram to Moscow asking for details about Russian air cover. And one of the reason and for that... for Chinese generals urged Russian air cover because they had tremendous experience during the Chinese civil war in the late 1940s when experiencing the nature of the air power and many knows that the USA air power is much powerful, stronger than the national Chinese had. So when the Beijing's telegram went to Moscow, and after Sterling made the promise he went to his general for the consultation about how Russian air force can help China. His general told him that it was a bad idea. It's a bad idea to send Russian air force to China to get involved in Korea. And at least his general told Joseph Sterling that they were not yet ready and Sterling asked them how long they would be ready. At least two months and a half so then Sterling send the telegram saying there was a problem for the air force air cover by Russian air force. So Chinese sent them to China, then Chinese sent the Premier [indiscernible] to Moscow immediately to negotiate about Soviet air power issues. And during that negotiation Sterling told [indiscernible] that his air force was not ready and his air force could only provide the air cover at this point up to the Yalu River... not across. And that created a big problem in Beijing. Once you see the travel of the telegram back and forth and the words carry [indiscernible]. And the war finally starting towards [indiscernible] that is, his air force would be ready only in two months and a half. But at this point you have to go into Korea alone by your ground troops.

So one more informed his general Pong and one more are the two things. Number one, he did not believe the air power should play a significant role in war. Number two, he had already made up his mind to send the troops because of geo-political considerations. But however his

general reacted differently and General Pong almost resigned from the position. He flew back from north-east China and to Beijing and Mao had a different time schedule back then than anyone else. Mao tended sleep in the day time and worked at night. And so Pong returned to Beijing in the day time, ran into Mao's residence in the mid of day and Mao was sleeping and woke him up and said he won't go if without air cover. But Mao persuaded Pong that he had to go. And of course Sterling also sent a telegram convincing them that entire he had to go and they spoke about if you don't go this time, you are going to lose Taiwan forever, same kind of argument made by Sterling. And Mao also said that... that's the Chinese way of thinking and we never can think that way. One of the arguments that Mao made was if we go in Korea we will beat him and push back by UN forces. But we can still go back later. If we don't go at this time we will not be able to get in forever. So that was the argument Mao made to General Pong and said, "You have to command your troops and go to Korea." And with due expect the Soviet Union send their air force in two months and a half.

So the hopes for the Soviet support was still there. So after the shuffle and back and forth, go or do not go for almost a week and finally by October 18th the decision was hammered. The troops went to Korea next day, so October 19th and the Chinese troops and across the Yalu River. So that kicked off Chinese intervention in Korea. And now let's talk about China's air plan and strategy. My early slides point out that in October 1950, China did not have a real air force. Only a handful of pilot just started flying the MiG-15 solo on the Soviet, on the Russian pilot's instruction. Of course no Chinese commanders and officers have air compact experience too... nothing, zero. So what kind of strategy they were supposed to take? So they came out, what we call a prudent strategy which means the accumulation strands and concentrate employment in time and attack. Which means you cannot send your forces as a piece of the mirror and in to the combat. You have to train them together and use them together what we call 'concentrate employment in timely attack.'

And there they see that this should get into the air war in two stages and first they should rush that regiment who is already flying in the MiG-15s and those propeller and fighters at the time to go in and protect the transportation lines. And during this stage it will be a learning period under the Soviet assistance. I want to point out that even though Sterling said his forces were not ready for interventions but however, remember Sterling already send one meet division in China at that time. But that division was responsible for defending the Chinese territory. So Yalu River is a part under their air defense mission so that provides the Chinese a learning period to learn compact experience under the Soviet tutor. That's why in the early November, UN pilots saw some actions in the air compact over the Yalu River. They were Russians and they were assigned to China for air defense.

And the second stage that is since Chinese learned some air doctrine influence influenced by the Russians, to provide ground support is a major role for the air force. So in order to provide ground support they need to build the airfield inside North Korea, otherwise nothing can be done for the ground support. And once those airfields completed, China was able to send a significant number of air craft to commence the full scale air war in Korea. The time was set up in the spring 1951 that is also the time very close to the Russians were ready and they send their units into Korea. So that is a plan or strategy set up for Chinese air force intervention or involvement. So this slide shows that the first group, flying group of the force division as sent to Korea in the

late December as a learning experience for them. So that you see the eight pilots and that is the same group with the division commanders on the side. And this is the first pilot who claimed to shoot down an American aircraft. And in the meantime they are suppose to build the airfield and what the L-FUSE is suppose to depute is all the major airfield is in those area, the Njung area and later the area we know as MiG Alley and in those areas and then maybe two down the Peen yang and here... are the Peen yang here, two down here and the four in those areas.

But what happened to the efforts to construct an air force. Chinese mobilized one army devoted to airfield constructions, deputed the air feud at night, by day time they were bombed. Deputed again and they bombed and after several months they realized that it's impossible to get that airfield self respect. One problem was because Russians had provided very limited assistance and new units started to get into China, starting to see from November to October. But the true unit designated for the Korean operation was sent to China in December and one of the stories here is that one Russian mid-division yearly equipped with 120 men and one problem that Russians came across was that the shortage of the plans. So they had to break that up one normal division into two. So which means they were going to send one division to China only half the strength of a normal unit. So 60 aircraft as one division and though it was send to China they have ordered from the start that is they will only provide air defense in the rare. So they were restricted to go further down into the territory of North Korea. Second, Russian air force did not order to cooperate with the Chinese run operations. So no cooperation between Russian air force and the Chinese run operations. What kind of, allies you try to think about that is?

Another problem that both Russians and Chinese encountered was the short range of the MiG-15s. Since MiG-15s cannot fly deep into the North Korean territory and during my research I tended to understand that each time when the MiG-15 take off from the air field on the Chinese side of the Yalu River they can just take a circle patrol and come back in an hour, not longer than that. And I just told the people from the museum at lunch I said that at the end there were 800 Chinese pilots baptized in the air compact in Korea. But how many really actually saw the enemy plane, perhaps not many. I interviewed a few pilots and they told me that if you were lucky enough you'd see the enemy planes during your patrol. You saw that and second lucky enough for them is you could fire shots at them. Now think about whether to hit them or not... fire a shot and then you come back. The ground crew said, "Oh, your plane has open fired because the smoke on the fuselage." That will be a good sign because you are engaged in compact and so the short range of the MiG-15 is another problem for Chinese to think about implementing their plan which I said earlier. And because the Chinese finally realized that, they are unable to put those airfield service board and they are unable to send their air units into North Korea. So they cannot provide direct help support for the ground operations.

And General Pong also became very angry about that and at that time Mao asked him to launch his six offensive campaigns. If you study the Chinese side of the Korean War experience they already have five offensive campaigns and a launch which pushed the UN forces on the other side sort of, of the 38th Parallel. But once the UN forces hold the line starting to push back the communist forces back to the 38th line, to hold that line, and Pong's starting to think about a six offensive campaign. When he designed that campaign he expected air support. By June, I think by July... perhaps by August... the schedule pushed back and from April to May then June started the rainy season and nothing could be done and it got pushed back to August and to

September. By that time he realized that his six offensive campaigns were unrealistic because he won't have air support. So he decided to cancel that and you can see that airfield has been repeatedly bombed by B-29.

This is the map that shows your Chinese air operation, the range. I may come back to this a little bit later. This map shows the mid-alley, not the Chinese air operations. As I mentioned earlier, Chinese intervention in the air war in Korea has three stages. The first one we talked really about the preparations. It's a very long period of time of preparation and from November all the way up to September 1951. And then the second stage is from September 1951 to the early... I try to think about is January or February 1952, that's what we call the learning period and then finally from that time to the end of the war they called Four Engagement.

During the early stage they expect Soviet assistance which means that each time their squadrons take off, behind them the Russian flies. And in the early stage they also tended to fly large formations with 16 planes together. I try to think about it and why that was during my research. And number one is old tactics they learned from World War II. Number two, perhaps the young Chinese pilot would feel more secured if they have 16 planes altogether flying over the enemy controlled space, air space. That was a very sad story at one occasion. I believe there are more patrols and over the North Korea's air space and they can cross nothing. Once they can cross the UN forces or F-86, which will be a bad day for them and at one occasion one formation, 16 formations lost... I think six to seven planes in just one battle, very bad and so you just basically become slaughtered by skillful UN forces. And after the period time or Soviet tutor age and they became the independent operations so they would fly on their own. But later they do develop a technique themselves which was more edgy, more maneuverable, more operational is a full plane as one flight and flying at a different altitude altogether. And so that will be more operational or a better way to do things and that is the theory that Chinese came out after the Korean War and that is air force did not strive for their own victory. Air force would take the ground victory as their own. Do you follow that? So air force does not need to make any efforts for victory as long as the ground troops are holding their territory, holding their position and defeating the enemy, it is their victory. This is the mentality growing out from that war experience. I will go and tell you later. So they concentrated on defending the key transportation lines. This is also very important. I want to show you... give you the significance later and at this point you just remember this that they were assigned to defend the key transportation lines. So they never had air support for the ground operations so they are taking the ground victory as the air forces victory. At the end China claimed it had shot 330 UN aircrafts. It lost 231 of its own aircrafts and in their claims majority of these... I have 86. I will come back to just by this later okay.

There are few cases I would like to show how the Chinese made that claim and then I will come back with the justifications. The first case talks about [indiscernible] and George Davis. I don't know how many of you really know who George Davis is. He is a Major. He is one of the worlds known Air Force aces in the Korean War. I'm trying to see... what was it about, here we go. This is the... when I wrote my book and one of the Korean War patron sent his photo to me and here... he is George Davis attacks him from Lubbock. He is very well known alright in the Korean War and he had for example, on November 30, 1951 and he and his squadron slaughtered Chinese bomb and fleet over the small North Korean island called Tawa Island on November 30. And Chinese sent nine of those two-two and bombers to attack that island and

this is the unit where my father serviced. At the time my father was the political commander of the regiment and this is the crew. This guy is my father's... he is under my father's command and at that time he was a group leader and during my research I interviewed him. Of course on that day what happened to him and his crew or his group became heroic action and I just sat there and tried to listen to what he told me. Perhaps the same story he repeated many, many times and on that day he lost four bombers, four and the Americans claims that they shot down nine or the total is nine. Five of them were injured... all of them were injured and the manager bad and four were stopped. And this guy served as escort with the propeller LR11 fighters and he was group leader and so I think the nine formations he was a leader in the front. After I interviewed him, I went back to another Korean War veteran. He's a ground crew and served with the same unit. He told me a different story about him. You never can see from the official records and he said that when he returned he almost collapsed... could not get out of the cockpit himself. To some extent he even said that he even wet his pants. But of course I never recorded that in my book. But I tend to believe that. You try to think about nine slow bombers slaughtered by a squadron of flight of F-86s. I think the George Davis claim shot down at least three. But as I said they exaggerated because each pass they had hit the plane, they thought they had hit and that must kill and the other wingman or another leader of the wing had come over and hit in the same plane and repeatedly. And so each one made their own claim so that shows you what George Davis was and the only escort the bomber has is this LR11 and propellified fighters and he had one shot at one of F-86. And later claimed he shot F-86 by propeller fighter and during my research I found out that he did hit that F-86 but never shot down that plane. That plane was flown by Lieutenant Marshall, the guy here. The 23mm cannon pole hit the steel plate on the seat and knocked him out. He passed out; the plane plunged almost to the sea level. He woke up and blew the plane off and so that's why the Chinese pilot claimed he shot down Lieutenant Marshall.

Now back to the George Davis story. George Davis was a very aggressive pilot because he so skilled for, you know, World War II and also in Korean War of a very high IQ. At that time I think he already had six mid chaos on his belt and on that date mission, I think on April 12th, he was suppose to fly over the Chung River and...no, Tatung River and in the Anju area. But he was not satisfied with that patrol. He told his wingmen, "Let's go further." I think he had eight machines... six or eight and he left it all back to the south and he flew the further. And there he encountered... there he encountered and this guy, he encountered him and then he later... and George Davis and claimed to shot down two MiGs and that moment and then later he was shot down. Well later the Chinese found out about this ... of the wreckage of the George Davis plane and his plane was very nearby. And when the American media broadcast that one of their aces lost in Korea, the Chinese air command asked their forces to find out who got him killed. And the ground troops found out from the two wreckage and the dog tags and other identifications and they credited him for the kill. What a justification made for crediting him because the Chinese claim that no Russians plane was flying over that area at that time on that day. Yes, officially maybe true but unofficially once you set the plane off in the sky how do you know where they are going to fly over? So during my research I tended to believe that George Davis was truly shot down by Russians rather than by this guy. But however he was credited by Chinese side because Chinese air force desperately needed some heroic story to mobilize the troops. You don't want to be a leader for a troop being beaten by the other side. Am I right? So

this became a perfect story for him to take credit for that they shot down George Davis. Okay, all of you with the Chinese about this? Probably not. *[Laughter]*

And the next case... then it came down to where those Chinese air force heroes came from? I told the research from the museum that is... during my research I feel that it came from individual personality. Some people have outspoken personality, talk a lot. Others do a lot by not talking a lot. So those people do a lot and never talk a lot can never be credited but those maybe did not really do anything but just talked a lot so they were always being credited, alright. This is the next case and then this pilot [inaudible] go forward, that's him. He claimed one day of a mission. He shot down four. I tend to believe that each time at the ammo he really left the gun barrel and after the shot. But at the end of it he was shot too. He rescued a compact lucky enough because those MiGs were shot down always over the friendly territory. They always can thrive back... won't be send back to the POW camps. And so he came back and claimed that even though he was shot down because he finished all his ammo and so he was finally shot down. But he claimed he shot four U.S. aircraft and I tend to believe he shot nothing but he talked a lot and he took the credit, again, the same story. The Chinese commanders needed the good news not always the bad news.

And in that case also try to tell you what they tried to justify ... it's called Wang Hey and his flying group. And Wang Hey was considered as a Korean War hero and also his flying group was highly credited and Wang Hey eventually made the command of the PLA air force. Where is Wang Hey's group? That is Wang Hey and his flying group. And what is interesting enough is all those people who claimed they are heroes over the American pilots, they had experience of being shot down. This, you see I said Chang Ji Hui was shot down, Lui was shot down. He was shot down too but nonetheless he has maintained a record of four killed and five injured, damages.

And the last case is about [indiscernible] and how raw and efficient and perhaps only the case I tended to believe that kill should be credited to Chinese is this one. Again in April 1953 at the end of the day and US pilot became more aggressive because of the cross over the Yalu tribe and shot down those planes and the landing and took off. And that day and Fisher did the same thing and he was a wingman. And Fishery shot down his leader which was landing in two encounters because they were already in the landing pattern. But Fisher thought he shot both of the Chinese aircraft but actually he had shot down him over the Chinese airfield but however the Russian pilots also claimed he had actually shot him down. And officially it's interesting... repeatedly visited China and met him later. He was captured and stayed two years in Chinese prison and this you see that, that is one of the visits he made in his late years and during the Chinese air force museum because I can tell this. And he passed away last year. I believe he has been here many, many times and he passed away and he really got acquainted with him and so this is the only story I tend to believe should be credited to this young fellow over that kill. Okay, how to justify the Chinese claims? They claimed they shut down the 330 UN aircrafts. To me I believe that and most of them the F-86. To me I believe that is over exaggeration and why they did so? Number one, the political correct made those people to think they had to make that claim. Even though they said they have very strict rule to determine the kill. For example, the gun camera evidence, other pilots witness, a grand evidence. He said all the three should come together and to verify a cure. But at the end I believe that is if one of the rule can be used to justify the kill to

go ahead to do that. So that's why they have very high kills and as they claimed. I believe that both sides have exaggerated the claims but the Chinese way over what they were suppose to claim and no one can tell the truth. If anyone tried questioning about whether there was truly that many F-86 being killed, that is a big... that means you are going against political correct. That won't serve your individual good.

Okay, those are just photos and those are the photos you can see the mixed crew of Russians and Chinese playing the soccer game... seems like they are having fun. Russians only credited this pilot as a Chinese ace but he never got too far promoted because he was not an outspoken person. You see, those who spoke and talk back were always promoted faster and better recognition. You see, this the division commanders are studying the gun camera film trying to verify the kills. That's a Russian footage of gun camera film and to show their attack on the B-29. Those photos shows the Russian crew so on the top you can see the all dressed in Chinese uniform. This is the Russian crew. The Russian gun camera footage shows the kills.

Now what did China gain from the war? First Chinese air force expanded through out of the war. Started with four regiment and at the end they had... not a regime, regiment, I'm sorry Title 66 and regiments. Started war with about 100 air craft and now after the way they have more than 3000 air crafts and they also had some 800 pilots- 58 is on the ground personnel took part in operation in Korea. So from four sides, you can see the Chinese air force was growing significantly. I think that is perhaps one thing they should be proud of themselves. From ground zero nothing to one of the largest air forces in the world. But they actually learned that it's a strong emphasis on air defense and that is influence number one by Soviet doctrine which emphasize to gain else superiority through air defense not through air offensives or strategic bombing. And that is a complete contradictory to the theory given by Dewey and theory made by Mitchell. So that's why for a long, long time Chinese air force were build up on the concept of air defense for air superiority. So that is an institutional culture, traditional culture, embedded deeply in the Chinese air force as a service organization. I just want you to remember this.

Second, they were always discounting the role air power played in the war, particularly Chinese leaders, Mao especially. Even his son was killed by American bombing. He did not believe the air power played a major role in the compact he could not win in Korea. And each time when the people from the Korean front came back home to Beijing he asked them what was really the effect of air power about. And each time he heard the last casualties on air bombardment on his forces and he felt released because that proved in the theory. And it also strengthens his belief that man could overcome weapons. He strongly believed that and even whether you have air power or not is not critical for him to win the war. But nonetheless Chinese did recognize that. They could not achieve the total victory because of UN air superiority and that's why they could not organize any day time ground war, ground compact in the most part of the... during most of the war time in Korea. And another lesson they learned from that is the air power had to be used was restrained. You see that UN side never allowed the bombardment of the other side of the Yalu River. The communists never allowed the air operation beyond the 38th Parallel. So one lesson they seemed to have learned is air power served a more deterrent role rather than offensive law. So that's why Chinese never appeared anxious to get air force involved in any other confrontation since in Korea they had involved. One major example is 1979 when the war broke out between China and Vietnam and Chinese again did not use air force. Finally what they

got from Korea is, yes, the Chinese air force one of the biggest but far from being the best. When the Chief of the staff of the air force and claimed at that time China became an air power overnight, that is an overstatement. And China had a long way to go to be the air power and so ever since then. And one of the things that I want to argue is the air power did have a limited role from the Chinese perspective. For example they always can maintain the supply lines at night and they did stock by and a lot over the supplies during the war and never and strangled in the Chinese frontier in the front. That's perhaps one of the reasons the war eventually had to end at the 38th Parallel as it started. So that is one of the limitations about the air power.

So Korean War really made the Chinese become obsessed with air defense and of course this is a mindset that has also come from this so called the nature of the people's war doctrine and a strong air threat from the United States. And so they felt that the best way to build up the air force is for air defense, not for offence. And the Chinese air was not designed as a separatist to strike force but support in their arm forces. You see, I said earlier it took the army's victory as their own, that's one best example. And I already said they realized could have accelerators as a conflict. So airport cannot be used and employed with a free hand. So this is the conclusion I want to make. And for the past 60 years, today when we think about Korean War, when we think about what the Chinese air force had done, they have devoted energy and resources to developing a modern air force. But that air force has been always frustrated by the Chinese leader's misunderstanding of the role the air force is suppose to play and misunderstanding of the experience the air force had in Korean War and later the homeland air defense operations during the Cold War. So the misunderstanding by ignorance of the actual role the air power can play and I said at the very beginning, Chinese side of the story about the air compact in Korea and later and was the unbroken string of the victory and heroism. I know they have to challenge the book about that myself. But however few have their questions of the legitimacy of this record and stories, that's really a sad side about themselves.

Sometimes I talk to the Chinese air force officers. I say, "If you really want to be a grown up in terms as an Air power country, you have to recognize the truths about yourself. Until then you never can be fully grown." So those are common not only to the distortions but also to self delusion that perpetuated the view of the Chinese Air power as defense or deterrence force. So that's why I said what the Korean War experience means to Chinese air force. That means that they always considered themselves more like defense forces than offensive forces. They played a deterrence role rather than an offensive role. So today Chinese air force adopted a new doctrine calling the Chinese air force must be both offensive and defensive. But unless they truly understand what offensive means to the Air power, as long as defensive emphasis remains part of their doctrine I don't think it will fully become offensive air force. That's my view and although the speed of the Chinese air on space modernization has caused concerned in the West, progress is always likely to be constrained by the technological limitations of the Chinese defense industry and by resource it needs to support modernization. That's true but more important; perhaps the more essentially important is that the air and space transformation will continue to be tempered by inherent the differences in the institutional culture of the forces and the PRAF.

So people ask me what is the true problem for the Chinese air force for its modernization. I told my students at Air War College, I said, "It is institutional culture of the air force," because of

that institutional culture inherited from Korea as a defense force rather than an offensive force. My next article I am going to write and for the organization, that is what roles of the air power in China today have any impact on Chinese leadership decision in the future. I will perhaps go with this line of argument that is for forces never think itself to be used as an offensive force ever in their own history or their own experience and to what extend at the time it arose to the point they want to use air force as an offensive weapon. What is the gut feeling that came out to believe that service, arm service can do the job offensively because they had no such institutional culture ever developed by themselves. So to me the development of the institutional culture would take a much longer time to be a service to embrace both offensive and defensive capability as their independent strategically force. So that is the truth.